Contingency in Rorty

In Richard Rorty’s philosophy, the concept of contingency serves as a cornerstone for understanding his rejection of foundationalism and his embrace of a more flexible, historically grounded approach to knowledge, language, and ethics. For Rorty, contingency means that there are no necessary, eternal truths—no fixed structures that underpin reality. Instead, everything we believe, say, and understand is shaped by historical and cultural circumstances, always subject to change, and open to reinterpretation.

Rorty’s use of the term contingency reflects his rejection of what he calls the metaphysical tradition—the view that philosophy’s primary task is to discover objective truths about the world. In contrast, Rorty argues that all human knowledge is contingent because it is dependent on the historical and social contexts in which it is developed. This means that our vocabularies, our values, and even our sense of self are all products of the particular times and places we inhabit.

• Example: The way we talk about concepts like freedom or justice is not based on some universal, timeless understanding of those terms. Instead, our understanding of them has been shaped by specific historical events, social struggles, and cultural shifts. What counts as freedom in one era or society may look very different in another.

In this sense, contingency is both liberating and destabilizing. It frees us from the need to search for eternal truths but also leaves us with the unsettling realization that nothing we believe or value is fixed or immune to change. For Rorty, this is a condition we must learn to live with—and embrace.

A major focus of Rorty’s philosophy is the contingency of language. He argues that language is not a mirror of reality—it doesn’t reflect a pre-existing world of fixed truths. Instead, language is a tool we use to cope with the world, a product of historical and cultural evolution. The words we use and the ways we structure our thoughts are always contingent on the particular context in which they arise.

• Language as a Tool: Rorty suggests that language is not about discovering truth but about creating ways to make sense of our experiences and coordinate our actions. Different groups, at different times, have developed different vocabularies to meet their specific needs, and no single vocabulary has privileged access to the truth.

• Vocabularies as Contingent Constructs: Our vocabularies—the sets of terms and concepts we use to describe the world—are therefore contingent, and they evolve as our circumstances change. What makes sense in one historical moment may not make sense in another, and there is no ultimate vocabulary that captures reality once and for all.

Rorty extends his concept of contingency to human belief and identity as well. Just as our vocabularies are historically contingent, so too are the beliefs and values we hold. There are no essential truths about what it means to be human or what values we ought to live by. Instead, these are constructed through the narratives and vocabularies that we inherit from our culture and history.

• Belief as Contingent: What we believe is shaped by the language and concepts available to us at any given time. Our beliefs are therefore contingent on the vocabularies we happen to inherit and the social contexts in which we find ourselves. This means that our beliefs are always open to change as new vocabularies emerge.

• Identity as Contingent: Similarly, our sense of self—our identity—is contingent. Who we think we are is shaped by the narratives we tell about ourselves and the vocabularies we use to understand our place in the world. These narratives and vocabularies are not fixed; they evolve as we encounter new experiences, ideas, and social contexts.

Rorty’s concept of contingency has significant political and ethical implications. If our beliefs, values, and identities are contingent, then there can be no universal, objective foundation for politics or morality. This means that political and ethical debates should not be about discovering eternal truths but about negotiating and renegotiating the vocabularies and narratives that will guide our collective action.

• Ethics Without Foundations: For Rorty, ethics is not about finding a set of universal moral principles. Instead, it is about creating solidarity—finding ways to foster empathy and cooperation through shared vocabularies and cultural practices. Ethical commitments are not grounded in objective truths but in the contingent agreements we make with each other as we navigate our shared lives.

• Politics as a Contingent Process: Similarly, Rorty sees politics as a contingent process of constructing and reconstructing vocabularies that help us coordinate action and build solidarity. Political progress, for Rorty, is not about discovering the right principles but about expanding our vocabularies in ways that allow for greater empathy and inclusion.

• Example: Rorty often points to the development of human rights discourse as an example of how new vocabularies can emerge in response to historical circumstances. The language of human rights did not exist in the same form in earlier centuries, and its emergence allowed for new forms of solidarity and political action. However, this vocabulary is not fixed—it too is contingent and may evolve in the future.

Rorty’s emphasis on contingency has been both influential and controversial. Some critics argue that his rejection of foundations leads to relativism—the idea that any belief or value is as good as any other, since there are no objective standards to judge by. Others worry that Rorty’s contingency leaves us without any stable ground for ethical or political commitments, making it difficult to address serious moral questions or injustices.

• Rorty’s Response to Relativism: Rorty rejects the charge of relativism. He argues that just because our beliefs are contingent does not mean that they are arbitrary. We can still judge beliefs and practices based on how well they help us achieve our goals and foster solidarity. For Rorty, the fact that our values are contingent does not make them any less important or worth defending—it just means that we must be willing to revise them when new circumstances arise.

• Solidarity as a Response: Instead of searching for foundations, Rorty advocates for solidarity as the basis for ethical and political action. Solidarity, for Rorty, is not based on universal principles but on the contingent shared vocabularies and narratives that bind communities together. The goal is to keep expanding the circle of solidarity, finding new ways to include more people in our shared narratives.

The idea of contingency is also central to Rorty’s concept of the ironist. An ironist is someone who recognizes that their most deeply held beliefs and values are contingent, and therefore always open to revision. The ironist lives with the awareness that their final vocabularies—the set of terms they use to make sense of the world—are not grounded in any objective truths but are provisional tools that could change in light of new circumstances.

For Rorty, becoming an ironist is part of embracing contingency. It means being open to new vocabularies, new ways of thinking, and new ways of being. It also means recognizing that the search for certainty is ultimately a dead end, and that the best we can do is to continuously reinterpret and renegotiate our beliefs in response to changing circumstances.

Rorty’s concept of contingency plays a crucial role in shaping the Communitarium Project. While Rorty emphasizes the importance of recognizing the contingency of our vocabularies and beliefs, the Communitarium Project seeks to harness contingency as a creative force. In the Communitarium, contingency is not just something to accept—it is something to actively work with, allowing communities to evolve and adapt as new vocabularies and circumstances emerge.

Where Rorty’s contingency often highlights the fragility of solidarity, the Communitarium aims to build structures and practices that allow for adaptive solidarity—solidarity that is flexible enough to withstand changes in language and culture but durable enough to sustain communities over time.

For more on how contingency shapes the Communitarium, see:

• Contingency in the Communitarium
• Rortyan Communitarium