In Richard Rorty’s philosophy, irony is a central concept, particularly in his work *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Rorty uses irony to describe a specific attitude toward one’s own beliefs and vocabularies—a recognition that they are contingent, historically constructed, and always open to revision. The ironist is someone who lives with the awareness that their most deeply held values and convictions are not based on universal or eternal truths but are the result of their particular historical and cultural circumstances.
For Rorty, the ironist is someone who fully accepts the contingency of their own final vocabularies. Final vocabularies are the sets of words and concepts we use to make sense of the world and define our identity. Most people operate within their final vocabularies without questioning them. The ironist, however, is constantly aware that these vocabularies are contingent—subject to change and revision—and thus never fully secure.
This ironic stance is not one of cynicism or relativism, but rather of openness. The ironist is always ready to reimagine their beliefs and values in light of new circumstances or experiences. This openness to new vocabularies allows for flexibility in thinking, but it can also lead to a sense of constant flux and uncertainty.
The concept of final vocabularies is crucial to understanding Rorty’s irony. A final vocabulary is the set of terms that we use to describe ourselves and the world, and it is usually taken for granted. For most people, their final vocabulary seems natural and inevitable. It is the language they use to talk about morality, politics, selfhood, and meaning.
The ironist, however, recognizes that their final vocabulary is contingent—one of many possible vocabularies that could have developed. They live with the constant awareness that their vocabulary might one day be superseded by a new one, and they are always ready to engage in a process of redescription. This process of redescription is how the ironist navigates the world, constantly revising and rethinking their beliefs.
Irony, in Rorty’s sense, is deeply connected to the idea of contingency. The ironist understands that their beliefs and values are not founded on any ultimate or objective truths but are instead the product of historical accident. This awareness of contingency fosters an attitude of irony, where the ironist is never fully committed to any one set of beliefs but remains open to the possibility of reimagining them in light of new experiences or ideas.
Rorty contrasts this with the metaphysical view, which assumes that there are foundational truths that can provide certainty and stability to our beliefs. The ironist rejects this search for certainty, embracing instead the fluidity and flexibility of contingency. For the ironist, nothing is beyond revision, and the search for finality is replaced by the ongoing practice of redescription.
Rorty’s concept of irony has important implications for both ethics and politics. In the realm of ethics, the ironist’s recognition of contingency means that there are no absolute moral principles to guide our actions. Instead, ethical behavior becomes a matter of pragmatic decision-making, where we use the vocabularies available to us to make choices, always aware that these vocabularies are open to change.
In politics, the ironist is similarly skeptical of grand narratives or ideologies that claim to provide the one true path to justice or social order. Instead, the ironist advocates for flexibility in political discourse, allowing for the constant renegotiation of values and priorities as circumstances change. This attitude is especially relevant in pluralistic societies, where multiple, competing vocabularies must coexist and interact.
Rorty’s concept of irony has been the subject of considerable criticism. Some argue that the ironist’s constant openness to redescription leads to a form of moral relativism, where no belief or value can ever be defended with conviction. Others worry that the ironist’s skepticism about their own final vocabulary undermines the possibility of committed political action. If we are always ready to revise our beliefs, can we ever truly stand up for justice or equality?
Rorty responds to these criticisms by emphasizing that irony does not mean indifference or inaction. The ironist is still capable of making ethical and political commitments, but they do so with the understanding that these commitments are contingent. For Rorty, the recognition of contingency does not weaken our beliefs—it simply makes them more flexible and adaptive.
In Rorty’s philosophy, irony is not a rejection of belief or value but an attitude of openness and flexibility. The ironist lives with the awareness that their final vocabulary is contingent and subject to change, and they embrace the process of redescription as a way of navigating the world. While irony has its critics, Rorty argues that it is a necessary stance in a world where certainty is unattainable, and it allows us to engage with the complexities of life in a more creative and adaptive way.
For more on Rorty’s broader philosophy, see: