Richard Rorty’s concept of solidarity is central to his philosophy, particularly as presented in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). For Rorty, solidarity is not based on shared access to universal truths or on some essential human nature. Instead, it is rooted in the contingent, historical development of shared vocabularies and empathetic imagination. Solidarity, for Rorty, is about creating common ground through the imaginative process of putting oneself in another's shoes, rather than through appeals to objective or absolute principles.

Rorty challenges the traditional philosophical quest to ground solidarity in rationality or universality. In contrast to thinkers who have sought to establish common ethical foundations based on reason or shared human nature (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative or Habermas’s discourse ethics), Rorty rejects the idea that solidarity must be based on universally valid principles.

Instead, Rorty argues that solidarity is contingent on the vocabularies we happen to share at any given moment in history. These vocabularies are historically and culturally specific, evolving over time as different groups and communities develop new ways of talking and thinking about themselves and others. Solidarity is possible, not because we all access the same truths, but because we use similar words and concepts to describe our experiences. In this sense, Rorty’s solidarity is fragile—it depends on the continued relevance of shared vocabularies, which are always subject to change.

• Example: Consider how solidarity has been built around shared vocabularies of human rights in modern political discourse. Rorty would argue that this solidarity is contingent on the widespread acceptance of the language of human rights, which has been shaped by historical events, cultural shifts, and social movements. If the vocabulary of rights were to fall out of favor, the solidarity built around it would become more tenuous.

For Rorty, the key to building solidarity lies in empathetic imagination. Rather than trying to appeal to rational principles, Rorty believes that we develop solidarity by imagining what it would be like to be in another person’s position. This imaginative act allows us to understand and empathize with others, even if we do not share the same background, experiences, or beliefs.

• Imaginative identification: Solidarity, then, is a matter of imaginative identification with others—of recognizing the contingency of our own beliefs and vocabularies and using this awareness to engage with the experiences of others. Rorty sees this as a more effective way of fostering community than attempting to base solidarity on shared truths.

Importantly, Rorty’s notion of empathy is not universal. It is contingent on the ability to find enough commonality in our vocabularies to bridge differences. For example, Rorty argues that it is easier to empathize with those who share similar vocabularies—those whose experiences we can imagine more readily—than with those whose lives are structured by entirely different ways of speaking and understanding the world.

• Example: It may be easier for someone raised in a liberal democracy to empathize with someone from another liberal democracy than with someone from a radically different cultural or political background. The shared vocabulary of democracy, freedom, and rights provides a basis for empathetic identification, even if the two individuals come from different nations or traditions.

One of the key aspects of Rorty’s conception of solidarity is its inherent fragility. Since solidarity is not grounded in eternal or objective truths, it is always vulnerable to shifts in language and belief. As shared vocabularies evolve, the basis for solidarity may erode. This makes solidarity a constantly shifting and negotiated project, rather than something that can be established once and for all.

• Vocabularies and Change: Rorty’s point is that solidarity is historically situated. The solidarity that emerges in one historical moment may not persist in the next if the vocabularies that sustain it lose their relevance. This fragility means that we must continually reimagine and recreate the bonds of solidarity in light of changing circumstances.

• Solidarity and Crisis: Rorty also suggests that crises—moments when existing vocabularies fail to explain or resolve new challenges—can offer opportunities to expand solidarity. In these moments, new vocabularies may emerge, allowing us to imagine new forms of solidarity that were previously unavailable. However, such moments also carry the risk of solidarity unraveling if no new common ground can be found.

Rorty’s rejection of foundationalism—the idea that there are fixed, universal principles that can serve as a basis for knowledge or morality—extends to his notion of solidarity. He does not believe that we need an appeal to something like human nature or objective moral truths to foster solidarity. Instead, he suggests that solidarity can be built through shared narratives, vocabularies, and cultural practices, which emerge from historical contingencies.

• Rorty’s Challenge to Essentialism: In rejecting essentialist ideas of human nature, Rorty challenges the notion that solidarity must rest on something inherent in all human beings. Instead, he posits that solidarity is constructed and reconstructed through the vocabularies we share, which are always subject to revision.
• Cultural Practices and Solidarity: By focusing on shared cultural practices rather than on metaphysical or ethical foundations, Rorty argues for a more flexible and dynamic understanding of solidarity. As vocabularies shift, so too do the possibilities for solidarity, which can expand or contract depending on the narratives we tell ourselves and others.

Rorty’s conception of solidarity has been influential in philosophical, political, and cultural debates, especially among those who seek alternatives to universalist or essentialist frameworks for understanding community and cooperation. His emphasis on the role of language and narrative in creating solidarity resonates with postmodern critiques of traditional philosophy and with those who view identity and ethics as socially constructed.

However, Rorty’s ideas have also been criticized, particularly by those who argue that his rejection of universal principles makes his account of solidarity too relativistic. If solidarity is entirely contingent on shifting vocabularies, some critics worry that it could be too fragile to sustain meaningful ethical or political commitments. Others argue that Rorty’s focus on language and imagination overlooks the material conditions—such as power dynamics and structural inequalities—that also shape the possibility of solidarity.

The Communitarium Project takes Rorty’s ideas on solidarity and builds upon them, seeking to create a form of solidarity that is more durable and embedded. While Rorty’s solidarity is fragile, contingent on shifting vocabularies and empathetic identification, the Communitarium seeks to structure solidarity through shared practices, rituals, and ongoing social interactions that help to sustain communal bonds even as language and culture evolve.

In this way, the Communitarium moves beyond Rorty’s individualistic ironist, who is always aware of the contingency of their own beliefs, toward a collective process of community-building. Solidarity, in the Communitarium, is not just a matter of shared vocabularies but of practices that help communities adapt to change without losing their coherence.

For more on how the Communitarium expands Rorty’s ideas, visit:

• Solidarity in the Communitarium
• Contingency in the Communitarium
• Rortyan Communitarium