One of the most important concepts in Richard Rorty’s philosophy is that of final vocabularies. For Rorty, final vocabularies are the set of terms, descriptions, and concepts through which individuals make sense of their world, define their identities, and express their most deeply held beliefs. These vocabularies are considered “final” not because they are eternal or unchanging, but because they represent the current limits of an individual’s ability to express meaning.

A final vocabulary is the set of words and phrases that a person uses to describe themselves, their values, and their place in the world. These vocabularies are called “final” because, in any given moment, they are the most authoritative set of terms an individual can use to articulate their understanding of reality. However, Rorty insists that even final vocabularies are contingent—shaped by historical, cultural, and personal circumstances—and always open to revision.

• Example: A person might use terms like freedom, justice, or progress as part of their final vocabulary to describe their values. These words hold deep meaning for the individual, and they form the basis for how they interpret their actions and the world around them.

Rorty argues that final vocabularies are contingent, meaning that they are not rooted in any absolute or universal truths. Rather, they emerge from the specific historical and cultural contexts in which an individual is situated. This means that final vocabularies are temporary and adaptable; they reflect the current state of a person’s understanding but may change as new experiences, ideas, and vocabularies are encountered.

• Example: Someone growing up in a liberal democracy might use terms like rights and freedom of speech in their final vocabulary to describe what they value about their society. However, if that person were to live in a different cultural context or experience a significant life change, their final vocabulary could shift to include new terms that reflect a different understanding of freedom or justice.

Rorty introduces the concept of the ironist as someone who is deeply aware of the contingency of their final vocabulary. An ironist understands that their most cherished beliefs and values are not grounded in universal truths but are provisional and subject to change. This awareness allows the ironist to maintain a certain intellectual flexibility, always open to the possibility that their current final vocabulary could be revised or replaced in light of new experiences or conversations.

• The Ironist’s Dilemma: The ironist lives with the tension of knowing that their most deeply held beliefs could be reinterpreted or overturned, which creates a unique kind of self-awareness. Rather than seeking certainty, the ironist embraces the ongoing process of reimagining their final vocabulary as they encounter new ideas.

For Rorty, an individual’s identity is closely tied to their final vocabulary. The terms that people use to describe themselves—their beliefs, values, and affiliations—are central to how they understand who they are. However, because final vocabularies are contingent, Rorty suggests that identity is also fluid and open to change. People are constantly reshaping their sense of self as they revise the vocabularies through which they interpret their place in the world.

• Example: A person who identifies as a defender of human rights may define themselves in terms of certain principles—equality, freedom, dignity—that are part of their final vocabulary. However, as they engage with new social movements or perspectives, they might find themselves redefining these terms or adopting new concepts to reflect their evolving understanding of justice and identity.

Although final vocabularies provide individuals with a sense of coherence and stability, they are ultimately fragile. This fragility arises from the fact that they are contingent and subject to revision. When a final vocabulary is challenged—either by new experiences, shifting cultural contexts, or encounters with alternative vocabularies—individuals may find themselves questioning the very foundations of their beliefs and identity.

• Example: A person who has always understood freedom in terms of individual autonomy might experience a challenge to this understanding when exposed to collectivist or communal interpretations of freedom. This encounter could lead them to question the terms they’ve used to define their values, potentially prompting a revision of their final vocabulary.

One of the ways individuals can respond to the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies is through a process Rorty calls redescription. Redescription involves finding new ways to describe one’s beliefs, values, and experiences, often by adopting new vocabularies or reinterpreting old ones. For Rorty, this process is essential for intellectual and moral growth, as it allows people to expand their understanding of the world and adapt to new situations.

• Example: A person who once described their political views in terms of individual rights might, through exposure to environmental ethics, begin to incorporate terms like ecological responsibility or interdependence into their final vocabulary. This redescription reflects a deeper, more nuanced understanding of their place in the world.

Rorty’s concept of final vocabularies has been subject to critique, particularly by those who argue that it leads to relativism. Critics suggest that if all vocabularies are contingent and subject to revision, it becomes difficult to make stable moral or political commitments. Without a foundation for truth or justice, some fear that final vocabularies offer no reliable guide for action or ethical judgment.

• Rorty’s Response: Rorty counters this critique by arguing that the contingency of final vocabularies does not undermine their importance. Even though final vocabularies are provisional, they still carry deep personal significance and guide action in meaningful ways. The fact that these vocabularies can change does not make them less valuable or less reliable in the present moment—it simply means that individuals must be willing to reimagine them when necessary.

Rorty’s concept of final vocabularies also has significant implications for political and ethical thinking. If all vocabularies are contingent, then political and ethical debates should not be about discovering universal truths but about finding shared vocabularies that allow people to cooperate and achieve common goals. For Rorty, the task of politics is to build solidarity by creating vocabularies that foster empathy and understanding, rather than appealing to objective moral principles.

• Example: In a democratic society, political actors might come from different backgrounds with different final vocabularies, but they can still work together by finding overlapping vocabularies that allow them to communicate and collaborate. Rather than trying to prove that one vocabulary is more “true” than another, Rorty suggests that the goal is to find vocabularies that help build solidarity and cooperation.

For Rorty, final vocabularies are both powerful and fragile. They shape individuals’ identities, guide their ethical and political commitments, and provide a framework for making sense of the world. However, they are always contingent—subject to revision as new experiences and vocabularies emerge. The ironist, aware of this contingency, remains open to the possibility of reimagining their final vocabulary, embracing the ongoing process of redescription as a means of intellectual and moral growth.

For more on how final vocabularies influence identity and politics, see:

• Irony in Rorty
• Contingency in Rorty
• Conversation Stoppers and Conversation Deflectors
• Solidarity in Rorty